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Australian bat lyssavirus (ABL) was first
reported in July 1996 in a black flying fox
(Pteropus alecto) from Ballina, New South Wales
(1,2). ABL has been confirmed in five species of
Australian bat: four species of flying fox
(suborder Megachiroptera, genus Pteropus) and
one species of insectivorous bat (suborder
Microchiroptera, Saccolaimus flaviventris). Two
cases of human ABL infection have been
reported. The first case occurred in a 39-year-old
female animal handler from Rockhampton,
Queensland, in November 1996, within 5 weeks
of her being scratched and possibly bitten by a
yellow-bellied sheath-tailed bat (S. flaviventris)
(R. Taylor, pers. comm.). The second case
occurred in a 27-year-old woman from Mackay,
Queensland, in December 1998, >2 years after a
bite from a flying fox. Both patients died (3,4).
ABL is a member of the family Rhabdoviri-
dae. Although ABL possesses marked serotypic,
antigenic, and molecular sequence similarities to
classic rabies virus, it represents a distinct, new
genotype, genotype 7 of the Lyssavirus genus (5).
The clinical signs of ABL infection in the two
human cases were consistent with those of classic
rabies infection and included a diffuse, nonsuppu-
rative encephalitis that led to death (3,4). Bats with
ABL infection are frequently reported to have
had hind limb paresis. While most infected bats
are depressed when found, some exhibit
uncharacteristic aggression toward humans or
other bats. Frequently, a nonspecific, nonsuppu-
rative meningoencephalitis is seen in brains of
infected animals (6,7). Vaccine protection trials
in mice conducted at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia,
supported the decision to use human diploid cell
vaccine (HDCV) for human ABL prophylaxis
(7-9). Historically, Australia has been considered
free of rabies and rabieslike viruses. Thus, before
the first human case of ABL infection in 1996, no
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Two human deaths caused by Australian bat lyssavirus (ABL) infection have been
reported since 1996. Information was obtained from 205 persons (mostly adults from
south Brisbane and the South Coast of Queensland), who reported potential ABL
exposure to the Brisbane Southside Public Health Unit from November 1,1996, to
January 31, 1999. Volunteer animal handlers accounted for 39% of potential exposures,
their family members for 12%, professional animal handlers for 14%, community
members who intentionally handled bats for 31%, and community members with
contacts initiated by bats for 4%. The prevalence of Lyssavirus detected by fluorescent
antibody test in 366 sick, injured, or orphaned bats from the area was 6%. Sequelae of
exposure, including the requirement for expensive postexposure prophylaxis, may be
reduced by educating bat handlers and the public of the risks involved in handling
Australian bats.Resear Resear Resear Resear Research ch ch ch ch
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measures existed to prevent rabies or rabieslike
disease acquired as a result of contact with
Australian domestic animals or wildlife. Since
the first human ABL case, the Queensland
Health Department, in accordance with the
recommendations of the national Lyssavirus
Expert Group, has provided postexposure
prophylaxis (PEP) to persons who report
potential exposure to ABL through bites,
scratches, and permucosal or percutaneous
exposure to bat saliva or neural tissue (9,10).
Preexposure prophylaxis is recommended for
persons who report frequent contact with bats.
Colonies of flying foxes are common in
suburban areas of southeast Queensland. The
black flying fox (Pteropus alecto) and the grey-
headed flying fox (P. poliocephalus) live there
throughout the year, and the little red flying fox
(P. scapulatus) occurs seasonally. While the
population of flying foxes may be decreasing in
southeast Queensland, fragmentation of colonies
has resulted in a wider distribution of smaller
colonies (L. Hall, pers. comm.). Direct contact
with bats by the general public and animal
handlers is not uncommon (11). Volunteer animal
handlers rehabilitate sick, injured, and orphaned
bats and are frequently bitten, scratched, or
exposed to bat saliva. Since November 1996, the
Brisbane Southside Public Health Unit (BSPHU)
and other state public health units have been
involved in coordinating lyssavirus PEP. This
article describes the pattern of potential human
exposure to ABL reported to the Communicable
Disease Control Section of BSPHU between
November 1996 and January 1999 and subse-
quent PEP. Disease prevalence findings are
presented for  bats surveyed in southeast
Queensland by the Animal and Plant Health
Service of the Queensland Department of
Primary Industries.
The Study
During the study (November 1, 1996, to
January 31, 1999), the Communicable Disease
Control Section of BSPHU served a population of
approximately 1.1 million persons in several local
government areas, south Brisbane (part of the
Brisbane City Council Area), Logan, Redlands,
Beaudesert, and Gold Coast (12). All persons who
reported a potential ABL exposure (bat bite,
scratch, percutaneous, or permucosal exposure to
bat saliva or neural tissue) were asked to
complete a standard questionnaire, which sought
demographic information (including occupation,
history of professional or volunteer bat handling,
history of rabies vaccination, potential rabies
exposure [bite, scratch, provoked, unprovoked],
circumstances that led to the exposure, treat-
ment received, and any laboratory investigation
of the bat).
A separate questionnaire was completed for
each occasion a person contacted BSPHU to
report potential ABL exposure. Potential expo-
sures were reported retrospectively, and the
dates of notification and potential exposure for
each case were included. All information was
recorded and analyzed by using an Epi-Info  6.04b
database (13). Age and gender-specific notifica-
tion rates were calculated by using estimated
resident population data for 1997 (12).
During the same period, healthy bats, sick
and injured bats, and bats involved in a potential
human exposure to ABL were tested for infection
with a fluorescein-labeled antirabies monoclonal
globulin (CENTOCOR) in a direct fluorescent
antibody test (DFAT) on fresh brain impression
smears at the Queensland Department of
Primary Industries Animal Research Institute or
at the CSIRO Australian Animal Health
Laboratories. Material from most bats that
tested positive for ABL infection and from bats
associated with a potential human exposure to
ABL were sent to either the Australian Animal
Health Laboratory or Queensland Health
Scientific Services for confirmation by DFAT,
virus isolation, and polymerase chain reaction.
Results
A total of 205 notifications to BSPHU met the
criteria for potential ABL exposure during the
study period, an average annual notification rate
of 8.1/100,000. Complete information was
obtained from 202 persons. Total notifications
included 86 males and 119 females (M:F ratio of
1:1.38). The age- and gender-specific average
annual notification rates are presented in Figure
1. Most reported potential exposures (116 of 204)
were among persons 19 to 49 years of age. The
months of potential ABL exposure and notifica-
tion are presented in Figure 2. Most notifications
(131 of 205) were made within 2 months of each of
the two fatal human cases. Nine (11%) of 80
notifications made in the 2 months following the
first reported case were related to exposures that
occurred >2 months before the first human case
was publicized. The median interval betweenResear Resear Resear Resear Research ch ch ch ch
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Figure 1. Age and gender-specific average annual
notification rates of potential human exposure to
Australian bat lyssavirus (n = 204) south Brisbane
and South Coast, Queensland, 1996-1999.
Figure 2. Dates of potential Australian bat lyssavirus
exposures and notifications to the Brisbane Southside
Public Health Unit, south Brisbane and South Coast,
Queensland, 1996-1999.
Table. Groups at risk for exposure to Australian bat lyssavirus
     Median
  No. of      interval
potential  Mean age      between Bite/nonbite Provoked
exposures   and age Gender  exposure and      injury     (%)
Groups at risk  (n=203) range (yrs)   (m/f) notification (d)     (n=202)  (n=202)
Volunteer bat handlers 79    40.5 15/64     19 56/23 79/79
(16-83) (0-2,105) (100)
Household or family member 24    17.5 12/12     27 18/6 24/24
  of volunteer bat handlers ( 5-51) (0-1,809) (100)
Professional animal worker 28    34 15/13       4 13/14 27/27
(17-69) (0-1,818) (100)
Community-intentional 63    39 40/23     10 41/22 62/63
 potential exposure ( 6-85) (0-2,907) (  98)
Community-unintential   9    32  4/5       2  3/6 4/9
  exposure (16-49) (0-32) (  44)
exposure and notification of these 80 potential
exposures was 17 days (0 to 1,080 days). In the 2
months following the second case, 22 (43%) of 51
notifications were related to potential exposures
that had occurred before the reporting of the first
human case. The median interval between
exposure and notification of the 51 potential
exposures was 728 days (0 to 2,907 days). A
further 14 (27%) of the 51 notifications were
related to potential exposures that had occurred
since the first human case but had not been
reported to BSPHU at the time of exposure.
Season of Exposures
Potential exposures to ABL were reported to
have occurred from 1991 to 1999, most during
spring and summer (September to February) (n =
151, 74%). While the occurrence of the two human
ABL cases in spring and summer influenced the
reporting of potential exposures at these times,
this trend of increased spring-summer potential
exposures persisted in the period between the
two reported human ABL cases. The highest
number of potential exposures (105) was reported
in the year of the first human case; 99 occurred in
the spring or summer of 1996-97.
Groups at Risk
Notifications were categorized according to
the person’s life-style and occupational potential
for exposure to ABL (Table). The group at highest
risk, volunteer bat handlers, reported 79 (39%)
potential exposures; 8 of these handlers reported
a second potential exposure during the study.Resear Resear Resear Resear Research ch ch ch ch
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Twenty-four (12%) notifications of potential
exposure were among household or family
members of volunteer bat handlers. Professional
animal handlers (e.g., veterinarians, wildlife
biologists, park rangers) reported 28 (14%)
exposures. Community members who handled
bats (usually in the course of freeing them from a
fence or entanglement) reported 63 (31%)
potential exposures. Community members re-
ported 9 unintentional potential exposures in
which contact was initiated by the bat.
The pattern of notification varied within
groups at risk during the study. The number of
potential exposures reported by volunteer and
professional animal handlers declined. Notifica-
tions by all groups were highest in the months
after the reported fatal human cases of ABL
infection. The number of potential exposures
reported in the 2 months after the first human
case (n = 80) was higher than after the second
case (n = 51), particularly among volunteer bat
handlers, who reported the highest number of
potential ABL exposures in the 2 months after
the first human case (43 [53%] of 80), decreasing
to 12 (24%) of 51 in the 2 months after the second
case. Notifications of potential exposures among
community members who had intentionally
handled bats rose from 11 (14%) of 80 in the 2
months after the first human ABL case to 23
(45%) of 51 in the 2 months after the second
human ABL case.
Nature of Exposure
Potential exposures were classified as bite or
nonbite exposures in accordance with interna-
tional recommendations (14). Most potential
exposures were bites (n = 132, 64%). The ratio of
bite to nonbite potential exposures within groups
at risk was highest among volunteer bat handlers
(56:23) (Table). Potential exposures associated
with unintentional contact with bats by
community members were predominantly
scratches (3 bite: 6 nonbite), whereas potential
exposures from intentional contact with bats by
all other risk groups were predominantly by
bites (128 bites: 65 nonbites). Potential
exposures were categorized as provoked
(arising from intentional contact with a bat) or
unprovoked (a contact initiated by the bat).
Most potential exposures (97%) were described
as provoked (Table).
Treatment
PEP was offered to all persons who reported
potential ABL exposures, in accordance with
international and Australian recommendations
(8,14). Standard PEP for unvaccinated persons
consisted of human rabies immune globulin
(HRIG, 20 IU/kg) on day 0 and 5 doses of HDCV
administered on days 0, 3, 7, 14, and 28. PEP for
immunized persons consisted of 2 booster doses
of HDCV administered on days 0 and 3. A
national shortage of HRIG required modifica-
tions to the standard PEP regimen. Sixty-two
potentially exposed persons received standard
PEP, 100 received 5 doses of HDCV only, 16
vaccinated persons received 2 booster doses of
HDCV, and 25 persons did not receive treatment
when the bat tested negative. Two persons
refused vaccination because of concerns about
potential vaccine side effects. Sixteen persons
ceased treatment when the bat tested negative.
The estimated cost of providing PEP during
this study was A$137,368, which included
A$30,930 for medical services funded through the
Commonwealth Medicare system (calculated on
the cost of six visits to a medical practitioner for
each person requiring a 5-dose course of PEP and
three visits for each person requiring 2 doses of
PEP); A$8,200 for public health officers who
interviewed potentially exposed persons;
A$10,600 for laboratory testing of the bats; and
A$87,638 for HDCV and HRIG. The cost of all
vaccines was met by the Queensland Health
Department.
ABL Test Results in Bats
All bats retrieved from a human exposure
incident underwent postmortem examination
and testing for ABL infection. Thirty-six bats
were tested; two were positive on DFAT and
polymerase chain reaction testing for
Lyssavirus—a black flying fox and a little red
flying fox. The tested bats included 13 black
flying foxes, 11 grey-headed flying foxes, 5 little
red flying foxes, and 7 insectivorous bats.
In a separate investigation, the Queensland
Animal Research Institute tested bats by DFAT
on brain impression smears for evidence of ABL
infection since June 1996. From November 1,
1996,  to January 31, 1999, some 153 healthy
wild-caught flying foxes; 181 healthy wild-caught
insectivorous bats; 366 sick, injured, or orphanedResear Resear Resear Resear Research ch ch ch ch
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flying foxes; and 39 sick or injured insectivorous
bats from the area served by BSPHU and greater
Brisbane were tested. Of these, 21 (6%) of the 366
sick, injured, or orphaned flying foxes tested
positive for ABL infection, including the 2
involved in human exposures in the BSPHU area.
All other bats tested negative.
Discussion
This is the first description of PEP provided
to an Australian community after the recognition
of human risk for ABL infection. The first human
case triggered a large national public health
campaign and considerable public awareness
about the risks from bats, particularly in
communities such as south Brisbane and  the
South Coast of Queensland, where large colonies
of bats live close to human urban populations and
bat/human interaction is not uncommon. In-
creased concern was demonstrated by the large
number of notifications of potential exposure that
followed reports of the two human cases
(Figure 2). Most potential human exposures
were among adults (ages 25 to 49). The increased
proportion of women reflects the high proportion
of female volunteer bat handlers in the study
population.
The first 2 months of notifications represents
a catch-up period in which PEP was provided to
persons with exposures dating back several
years. Relatively few notifications occurred after
the first 2 months of the study, and it was only
after the second human case, which had an
assumed incubation period of approximately 2
years, that another cluster of notifications
occurred (4). The median interval between
potential exposure and notification increased
from 17 days for those notified in the 2 months
after the first human ABL case to 728 days for
those notified in the 2 months after the second
case. The potential exposures reported in the 2
months after the second case included 22 persons
who were potentially exposed before the first case
and 14 with >1 month between potential
exposure and notification. The second human
case with its prolonged incubation period
reinforced the public perception of the severity of
this disease and prompted more notifications.
Potential exposures occurred most commonly
in spring and summer, coinciding with the
birthing season (October to December) of the black
and grey-headed flying foxes in southeastern
Queensland (15). During each birthing season in
southeastern Queensland, 100 to 300 neonatal
and juvenile black or grey-headed flying foxes are
reared by volunteer bat handlers (H. Luckhoff,
pers. comm.). These orphans are commonly
assumed to have been abandoned or separated
from their dams. Frequently, orphans are found
still clinging to the body of their dam. Further
research is required to identify any association
between orphaned bats and the ABL status of the
dam. A case of clinical disease in an in-care
juvenile black flying fox and the associated
exposure of eight humans has been described (6).
Most potential exposures (107 [52%] of 205)
were reported from groups who handled bats.
These groups were the target of initial public
health information campaigns to raise awareness
of the risks for ABL infection. PEP was provided
to members of these groups after the first human
case, and a recommendation was issued that all
workers in these fields be vaccinated with HDCV
and that unvaccinated persons, including family
members of volunteer bat handlers, not handle
bats. Seventy-two (35%) of 205 potential
exposures occurred among members of the
community. Most of these (63 [88%] of 72) had
rescued a trapped or fallen bat. The test results
from bats indicate that sick, injured, or orphaned
bats have a significantly higher crude prevalence
of ABL infection (p <0.001) than healthy wild-
caught or captive bats. Consequently, the risk for
ABL exposure among volunteer and professional
bat handlers and persons who rescue bats may be
relatively increased because these groups
primarily handle sick, injured, or orphaned bats.
Reporting of potential exposures among
groups at risk changed with time during the
study. One important factor in the management
of PEP was the requirement (introduced in 1997)
that all bats involved in a potential human
exposure be surrendered for postmortem exami-
nation and laboratory testing for ABL. Those who
care for bats are often reluctant to surrender
them for ABL testing. Notifications from
volunteer bat handlers declined during the study
period. While this may reflect a decline either in
the number of bat handlers or in potential
exposures among volunteer bat handlers,
underreporting may be occurring in this group.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this reductionResear Resear Resear Resear Research ch ch ch ch
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in notifications may reflect handlers’ concern for
the bats. Such underreporting could be associ-
ated with future human cases. Most potential
exposures resulted from intentional handling of
bats. The few potential exposures from unpro-
voked encounters suggest that bats rarely
initiate contact with humans.
The recognition of ABL infection has resulted
in a large public health program to provide
education, counseling, and prophylaxis to
volunteer and professional bat handlers and
members of the community who may be exposed
to ABL. The focus of the program has been to
encourage preexposure vaccination of bat
handlers, prevention of potential exposures by
avoidance of bat handling by nonvaccinated
persons, and prompt medical care when potential
exposures occur. The cost of PEP for all those
potentially exposed to ABL in south Brisbane and
the South Coast of Queensland during the study
was considerable. Future public health interven-
tions should continue to emphasize the risks
associated with interaction with bats to reduce
the requirement for PEP and the likelihood of
human cases of ABL infection.
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